While much is still unknown about the trajectory of the strike, my research and conversations with both ex-prisoners and former members of Israel’s security sector counter several key common myths.
Approximately 1,200 Palestinian prisoners are entering a third week of hunger strike, following the controversial publication of an op-ed in the New York Times on April 16 by the high-profile prisoner Marwan Barghouti.
The hunger strike has brought renewed attention to the contentious issue of imprisonment in Israel-Palestine, where the approximately 6,500 Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli jails are viewed as convicted terrorists by most Israelis but considered political prisoners by most Palestinians.
Hunger strikes are not new in Israel-Palestine; there have been dozens of strikes since the start of the occupation in 1967. However, as the first mass collective strike in several years, this strike is notable, especially with the leadership of Barghouti who, despite serving multiple life sentences, is often compared to a Palestinian Nelson Mandela and continues to enjoy popular support in Palestinian polls.
Yet many misconceptions about the hunger strike remain. While much is still unknown about the trajectory of the strike, my research and conversations with both ex-prisoners and former members of Israel’s security sector counter several key common myths.
MYTH #1: Prisoners are striking to get released from prison.
It is often assumed that prisoners engage in a hunger strike to seek early release from prison, but that is rarely the case. Palestinian hunger strikes, like those undertaken by prisoners in Northern Ireland and South Africa, are usually focused instead on improving conditions and seeking rights inside the prisons, articulated to prison authorities via a list of ‘demands.’
In past hunger strikes for example, demands have ranged from increasing the number of blankets allotted to prisoners, to giving more time in the yard, to granting access to books, radios, and television.
In the current strike, there are a number of stated demands, the primary being regular family visits. Israeli prison policy allows for two monthly family visits, however, because family members in the West Bank and Gaza must apply for permits to travel to Israel (which are often denied), some prisoners have gone years without a family visit.
Furthermore, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), reduced coordinated family visits last summer citing budgetary limitations.
Other demands include payphones to make family calls, improved medical services, and an end to administrative detention (detention without charge or trial).
MYTH #2: All Palestinian prisoners are terrorists.
The majority of the 6,500 Palestinian prisoners in Israel are termed ‘security prisoners,’ convicted on ‘terror-related’ charges.
However, according to the Israel Prison Service (IPS), only about 50 percent of prisoners have ‘blood on their hands,’ with others being members of groups supporting armed resistance, or individuals who were involved in operations as drivers, couriers, or abettors. (As a former IPS director I spoke with acknowledged, many of these so-called ‘small fish’ are not even aware that they are involved in a terrorist operation.)
Moreover, scores of Palestinians are charged and convicted for acts of popular resistance that are clearly distinct from acts of terrorism, such as throwing stones, a crime which since 2015 has been punishable by up to ten years in prison. Even activists engaged nonviolent protest are regularly arrested and charged with crimes of ‘incitement’ and ‘organising an illegal demonstration.’
Furthermore, the majority of convictions take place in Israel’s military court system, which is part of the broader martial law framework in the West Bank. In this system, those arrested can be held for up to 60 days without access to a lawyer, a period in which interrogations yield ‘confessions’ that are then used in court as primary evidence, resulting in a conviction rate of over 99 percent.
MYTH #3: Conditions in Israeli prisons are especially harsh.
According to conversations with ex-prisoners, conditions in Israeli jails have improved significantly since 1967, due in part to gradual gains from prisoners’ hunger strikes, combined with improved general policies. The ICRC makes regular visits to Israeli prisons and facilities are typically in line with international standards.
As noted above, the area of far greater concern is Israel’s criminal justice system in the Occupied Territories, which allows for mass arrests, widespread use of administrative detention, and interrogation methods that include cruel, inhumane, and degrading (CID) treatment.
Indeed, according to human rights group Addameer, approximately 40 percent of Palestinian males have been arrested or detained at some time, as well as hundreds of Palestinian women and minors.
Not all those arrested are charged or convicted, but many are detained for several days or weeks at a time and subject to intense interrogations, which can include the use of physical pressure, stress positions, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and threats to family members. After interrogation, most detainees are either charged in the military court or released. Increasingly however, others are held without charge or trial in administrative detention for renewable periods of up to 90 days.
This form of internment is permissible under international law (Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 78), but only as an exceptional measure in extreme cases. There are currently approximately 500 Palestinian administrative detainees, reflecting excess use that has been condemned by the United Nations, the European Union, and human rights organisations.
MYTH #4: Palestinian prisoners are pawns of their political leaders.
Palestinian politicians from all parties have sought to leverage the prisoners issue. However, since the 1970s, Palestinian prisoners have demonstrated notable agency in self-organising within and across prisons. Political factions and parties often supported or worked in tandem with prisoners, especially in the pre-Oslo era, but prisoners have increasingly organised with considerable independence.
To be sure, Barghouti’s leadership in the current strike is seen by many as a savvy move to augment his own standing and push back against Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas after being sidelined in Fatah meetings earlier this year.
While easily written off as a personal power-play, Barghouti’s move strategically puts pressure on the PA, which will have to balance between publically supporting the prisoners while also trying to control related protests and demonstrations across the West Bank. The timing is especially tricky for Abbas as he seeks to maintain weak internal standing while also preparing to visit the United States in early May.
Regardless of Barghouti’s motivations, the strike has extended beyond his circles to include other political parties. Moreover, as the strike continues, individual prisoners’ decisions to maintain it will become increasingly personal. While each person is different, the body can typically survive for about three weeks by drawing on stores of glucose and fat. After 20 days, the body starts breaking down muscles and organs. Most prisoners who commit to a long-term strike then are usually doing so for some degree of personal conviction and not solely by political direction.
MYTH #5: Israel doesn’t negotiate with prisoners.
The Israeli government has publicly stated that it won’t negotiate with the prisoners. However, the IPS, which has an interest in maintaining order in the prisons, has negotiated with prisoners in the past, sometimes conceding certain rights, or returning rights that were rolled back over the course of the strike.
Negotiations are usually preceded by other attempts to break the strike however, including punishments such as solitary confinement, or force-feeding hunger strikers (which was declared constitutional by Israel’s High Court last year).
At the state level, the traditional logic of hunger strikes is that the state will negotiate in the face of intense international pressure or local protests and demonstrations that threaten internal stability. However it is unlikely that solidarity mobilisation will be sustained to that level in this case. Any push by the state to resolve this hunger strike will most likely be motivated more by a desire to halt Barghouti’s political momentum.
It is most likely that Israel will try to ‘wait out’ the strike, at least until the number of participants decreases to a size that is manageable, or negotiate on rights that are rolled back during the strike. However, even if none or few of the demands are met, the strike has rattled Israeli leaders and is prompting difficult conversations on the issue of prisoners, which will continue to be a source of controversy but also potentially compromise in future negotiations.
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